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Somalia’s 2017 presidential election was billed as an opportunity for 
hope in a country that has not had a viable government able to broad-
cast power across the country for over 25 years. Though it was far from 
the one person, one vote election initially promised – reportedly on 
account of the parlous security situation - it did produce unexpected 
and (to some) welcome results.1 The victory of Mohamed Abdullahi 
Mohamed, known popularly as “Farmajo”, was welcomed with danc-
ing and demonstrations of pleasure from the streets of Mogadishu’s to 
Jijiga in neighboring Ethiopia and Garissa in next-door Kenya. Farma-
jo’s populist rhetoric, sprinkled with anti-Ethiopian invective and 
promises for jobs and peace in Somalia resonated with a number of 
Somali citizens. Yet Somalia’s election results also demonstrated struc-
tural factors that are potentially less welcome – factors that Farmajo 
and his allies appear to have been influenced by and were able to 
exploit. First, Somalia’s recent election, particularly the run-up to the 
election finally held in February 2017 (after multiple postponements), 
demonstrated the number of foreign actors with a stake in Somalia’s 
future is growing and changing as is the amount of foreign influence 
and its limits in Somali politics.  Second, the election showed just how 
reviled and discredited the previous presidential administration of 
Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud had become. Third, the results display the 
amount of foreign influence in Somali domestic politics and there-
fore the limits of Farmajo’s (or any other SFG president’s) mandate, to 
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include the ability to chart a truly independent policy agenda.  Fourth, 
the elections demonstrated that foreign money exercised a critical fac-
tor in electoral success, but that the choice of candidate was in some 
senses predicated by the demands of the “Somali street.”
II. Background
In mid-2016, a vote resulting in the election of a relative outsider as 
president of the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) appeared next to 
impossible. In this not-so-distant past, all bets were that then-President 
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was almost certain to win. This was not 
necessarily because he had been a particularly able or effective leader. 
Indeed, the rosy prognostications that accompanied his election in 
2012 largely came to naught.2 Nor was Hassan Sheikh popular. Rather, 
the money was on him because he had proved particularly adept in 
exploiting and expanding the levers of power and reach of state intimi-
dation at his disposal. Additionally, Hassan Sheikh was able to rely on 
the firm political and financial support of key foreign backers as well 
as exploit the fact that his major electoral opponents were themselves 
weak, discredited or both. Indeed, if the election had been held as 
initially scheduled in mid-2017, Hassan Sheikh would have almost cer-
tainly been reelected for six reasons: 
1. Lack of credible or viable opposition candidates
2. The size of Hassan Sheikh’s election war chest 
3. Hassan Sheikh’s ability to broadcast power through the  
 use of force and intimidation
4. Hassan Sheikh’s financial support from Turkey, financial  
 and political support from the UK, and political support  
 from Ethiopia
5. Clumsy political machinations of various states or their  
 corresponding inability to locate a viable opposition candidate  
 acceptable to the “Somali street”
6. A neutral or disinterested United States
In the lead up to the election, one article reported, “More than 20 presi-
dential hopefuls are running. Analysts contend that President [Hassan 
Sheikh] Mohamud has a good chance of keeping his office because 
he has received millions of dollars from Turkey and the United Arab 
Emirates to buy enough votes from the Parliament members who will 
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vote for a new president. Turkey, the analysts said, has invested mil-
lions in Mogadishu’s port and airport.”3 Additionally, “… the Emirates 
and Qatar are backing different candidates here in a rivalry over the 
Muslim Brotherhood, while Egypt and Ethiopia are supporting differ-
ent candidates because of their duel over the Nile.”4 While capturing 
the complexity and number of international actors, the analysis sim-
plified and therefore misconstrued the true fault lines and rivalries at 
play in Somalia’s presidential election. 
This article focuses on six states which attempted to influence the 
outcome of the 2017 Somalia presidential elections, only one of which 
is located in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, the article mentions 
the role of the United States of America (US), but only insofar as it 
remained a disinterested actor with the potential to have played a 
significant role had the domestic situation in the US been different. 
Importantly, for reasons of time and space, this article does not broach 
the role played by major international organizations such as the United 
Nations (UN) or bodies within the UN such as the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization (FAO), all of which continue to be powerful political 
and economic actors in Somalia. It also does not take into account the 
relatively important military and political role of Kenya given uncer-
tainty over Nairobi's true interests vis-à-vis the 2017 presidential can-
didates. Lastly, it only briefly mentions formerly powerful political 
actors in Somalia such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia which appear, for 
the time being, to have shifted their focus elsewhere; Egypt to its inter-
nal political situation and Saudi Arabia to Yemen and its domestic 
situation. 
This article subscribes to the oft-proved theory that states have 
interests and those generally revolve around power, both the projec-
tion of power as well as the maintenance thereof; its loss and/or gain. 
A necessary follow-on to this is the idea that states often intervene in 
the affairs of other states in order to balance or hedge their interests 
and, ideally, to gain power and influence within that state. The list of 
states attempting to influence the outcome of elections, democratic or 
not, ranges from the United States in Chile in 1964, to Russia in the 
2016 US elections, to Qatar in Egypt’s 2011 Arab Spring revolution 
and the election of the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed 
Morsi as president in 2012. Various schools of international relations 
thought attempt to explain the motivation for external involvement 
in elections in vastly different ways.5 For some, it is driven simply by 
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an attempt to gain influence within that state as a means of increasing 
power relative to other external actors. Others, however, point to more 
ideational motives, such as preference for the political stance of a par-
ticular candidate. This was likely the case in Qatar’s and Turkey’s overt 
support for Mohammed Morsi in Egypt during his brief tenure. Which 
side an external actor chooses to support is unlikely to be devoid of 
self-interest, even if assistance is veiled in the language of democracy 
promotion. The case of US involvement in Nicaragua in 2006 is instruc-
tive, for example. When states choose to engage in such behavior and 
when is the subject of much debate. However, what is not in question 
is that states do engage in this behavior. 
In the case of Somalia’s presidential election, the plethora of state 
actors attempting to influence it sets it apart from say US engagement 
in Chile or Russian attempts to influence the US elections. A second 
differentiator is the fact that the most influential actors turned out to 
be small or medium rising powers such as Turkey, the UAE or Qatar. 
Thirdly, these states’ actions tended to displace or usurp the influen-
tial roles played by other small-to-medium powers such as Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia, which had held sway in Somalia since the 1970s. Lastly, 
states such as Turkey and Qatar played roles that displaced arguably 
more powerful actors with a longer history of engagement in Somalia 
such as the US and the UK. However, this is not necessarily indicative 
of long-term change and was more the result of disinterest or lack of 
salience of this election in Washington DC and, to a lesser degree, in 
London, as discussed in greater detail below. 
What is important to understand prior to a discussion of exter-
nal actors and their role and rationale for influencing the election is 
that their engagement in Somalia may be viewed, for the most part, 
from the vantage point of emerging power diplomacy. Diplomacy and 
recognition play central roles in the conventional conferral of state 
legitimacy and functioning of the inter-state system. They focus on 
sovereignty and legitimacy; the diplomatic relationships fostered as 
well as the institutions of diplomacy constructed; and the strategic 
position of such diplomacy vis-à-vis the conventional state-system.6 
Andrew Cooper and Dennis Flemes focus on specific riddles about the 
foreign policy strategies of emerging powers like Turkey. While they 
focus heavily on Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the 
BRICS), they attempt to also provide answers to whether the prefer-
ence of emerging powers is to utilize established institutions or to use 
parallel and/or competitive mechanisms. The authors also look at the 
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balance between material interests, status-enhancement, and identity 
issues as motivators for policy preferences.7 In the case of Turkey, its 
actions in Somalia may largely be explained by its interest in accruing 
political capital in the form of international prestige. These developed 
organically and were most likely unintended outcomes, at least ini-
tially, in what was at first a humanitarian mission, as demonstrated 
below.8
III. Genesis of Power and Intimidation
A splinter group from al Islah (the Somali branch of the Muslim Broth-
erhood), Damul Jadiid (new blood) reportedly worked behind the 
scenes to elect Hassan Sheikh, an obscure and largely unknown local 
academic, in 2012.9 They were helped in this effort by Qatari money, 
reportedly secured by Fahad Yasin Tahir, formerly a member of reli-
giously militant Al-Itihad Al-Islami (AIAI), and the Chief of Staff for 
President Farmajo.10 
After his election, Hassan Sheikh and his Damul Jadiid allies side-
lined Fahad Yasin (and Fahad's protégé, Farmajo) and cemented their 
hold on power and monopoly on the use of force and government by 
assuming key posts in the SFG. These reportedly included the minis-
tries of justice, interior and the minister of state for the presidency.11 
By actively being able to utilize the forces at his disposal – his power-
ful kin (Hawiye), the military, the intelligence services, the treasury 
and Damul-Jadid - the president was by far the most powerful Somali 
political stakeholder to contest the 2017 presidential race. Furthermore, 
he was the incumbent – a factor that should have worked for him but, 
given his track record in power, may have ultimately worked against 
his reelection chances given anger and frustration on the street and in 




Figure 1: President Hassan Sheikh waters the dying tree of Somalia  
with the blood of Somalis. Source: Adapted from Amin Arts  
by Amin Amir: http://www.aminarts.com/
IV. The Opposition
Until mid-January 2017, the Somali electorate faced a choice between 
a corrupt current president, Hassan Sheikh; a corrupt and discred-
ited ex-president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed; and a corrupt prime 
minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. This list of choices argu-
ably favored the chances of a viable opposition candidate or pool of 
contenders who would then nominate a titular candidate. However, 
Somalia’s stakeholders, both in-country and the diaspora, appeared 
unable to coalesce around or support a particular candidate. That a rel-
ative outsider, Farmajo was able to ride a late wave of support had less 
to do with his populism, clean hands and apparent popularity than 
with an understanding that none of the other candidates, to include 
then-President Hassan Sheikh, were viable as the face of a new Somali 
government – both internally and externally - on account of reportedly 
massive corruption and mismanagement.12 There was a palpable sense 
of anger on the streets of Mogadishu and other major towns and cities 
in Somalia.13 There was also a sense of disenchantment among many 
in the substantial diaspora communities in London, Toronto and Min-
neapolis that was informed as much by clan affiliation and politics as 
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by frustration at Hassan Sheikh’s reported penchant of being swayed 
to whichever side offered the most money.14
V. Election Funding
Anger on the street and amongst the large diaspora was aggravated as 
the 2017 presidential election campaign became marred by repeated 
allegations of vote buying.15 In a report issued just prior to the election, 
Marqaati, a Somali corruption watchdog claimed, “The main contend-
ers for the presidency, including the incumbent, Hassan Sheikh, stated 
that they plan to fight corruption if elected. This is however contra-
dicted by their actions as all are planning to use substantial amounts 
of money to bribe MPs.”16 Payments of reportedly $500-$1000 were 
made by various presidential candidates to Somali MPs in order to 
acquire the 20 signatures of MPs required to be listed as a presidential 
candidate.17 
Once this hurdle was cleared, another round of vote buying got 
underway, with votes for presidential candidates reportedly costing 
anywhere from $50K-$100K depending on the influence of the MP. But 
it seems that while many MPs were willing to take money from Has-
san Sheikh and consider voting for him, their voting options remained 
open until the last minute given the possibility that another bribe may 
have been on offer.18
This last sentence is crucial to understanding what transpired on 
February 8, 2017 in Mogadishu. That is, even though Hassan Sheikh 
had a sizeable reelection war chest at his disposal he was unable to 
ensure that his bribes resulted in the needed votes to confirm his 
reelection. It certainly was not for lack of funds. In power since 2012, 
Hassan Sheikh necessarily had access to the significant resources avail-
able to residents of Villa Somalia, the presidential building in Mogadi-
shu. Additionally, he had inked some lucrative tenders, making friends 
and enemies (inside and outside Somalia) in the process. Foremost 
among these were the contracts for the running and operation of Mog-
adishu’s international airport and the Port of Mogadishu. Both of these 
were awarded to Turkish companies with strong ties to the AK Party 
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the airport and port are estimated to run anywhere between $11 and 
$20 million, per month.19 Turkey and Turkish companies have been 
commended for competently upgrading and successfully operating 
this critical infrastructure. And while the exact figures flowing to Villa 
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Somalia are uncertain, under the terms of the 20-year port agreement 
between Turkish firm Al-Bayrak and the Somalia Federal Government 
(SFG) of Hassan Sheikh, 55% of revenue generated at the seaport will 
go to the SFG and the remaining 45% to Al-Bayrak.20 This represents 
the major source of non-aid revenue for the SFG, thus underscoring 
and enhancing Turkey’s critical influence and behind-the-scenes politi-
cal power in Mogadishu. 
None of the opposition candidates running against the president, to 
include those who appeared to be his closest rivals had access, at least 
initially, to even a fraction of this revenue stream. Yet Hassan Sheikh 
did lose the election. In order to understand why, an exploration of 
pivotal states and their attempts to influence the election is in order. 
VI. Turkey
Turkey maintained a stance of strict public neutrality during the period 
leading up to Somalia’s presidential election. But Turkey is a powerful 
political actor in Somalia. Since 2011, Turkey has made Somalia a major 
focus of its foreign policy and its presence in Somalia certainly embod-
ies one of the most interesting, but widely misunderstood regional 
geopolitical developments in the past decade. 
Genuine humanitarian concerns, at least initially, drove Turkey’s 
engagement in efforts to alleviate a widespread and devastating 
famine in 2011-2012.21 The prospect of economic gain has played an 
equally important role in Turkey’s developing relationship with Soma-
lia. In the six years spanning 2011-2017, Turkey moved from being an 
economic footnote in Somalia to its fifth-biggest source of imports.22 
Turkey’s engagement has been unique in that it is tangible and lasting 
in the form of hospitals, schools and roads.23 Less tactile forms of aid 
such as scholarships, training and diplomatic efforts aimed at fostering 
political dialogue are targeted, coordinated from Ankara, and largely 
unilateral in nature.24 
As Turkey’s initial investments and efforts for influence in Somalia 
paid off in the form of infrastructure contracts, to include Mogadi-
shu’s international airport and its seaport.25 Turkey’s control of Soma-
lia’s most critical and lucrative infrastructure along with its substantial 
humanitarian aid necessarily make Turkey an important political actor 
in Somalia because of the leverage over, and relationship it has, with 
the SFG.26 Turkey’s clout has only grown with the October 2017 open-
ing of a military training facility in Mogadishu.27 This will reportedly 
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train up to 22,000 members of the Somali National Army and poten-
tially have major ramifications on the broadcast of power by the SFG. 
This means that Turkey has become one of the most significant actors 
in the calculations of Somali politicians.28
Given Turkey’s significant investment and political leverage in 
Somalia, Turkey had many reasons to desire the reelection of Has-
san Sheikh.  The president’s favoritism towards Turkey in the form of 
lucrative contracts was itself a byproduct of Turkey’s unilateral, highly 
personal, and coordinated approach to Somalia.29 Turkey’s approach 
included allegations of bribery and corruption that further enriched 
Villa Somalia and resulted in Turkish firms winning control of Soma-
lia’s two biggest revenue earners, the port and airport. Yet, the presi-
dent’s desire to work with Turkey, as well as Qatar and Egypt (under 
former president Mohamed Morsi), was reportedly driven by the reori-
entation of Somalia’s foreign policy away from IGAD and the African 
Union towards the Muslim Brotherhood world preferred by his Damul 
Jadiid allies and supporters.30 Perhaps most importantly, Qatari money 
and support for his election as president swayed Hassan Sheikh to be 
at least initially supportive of Doha’s foreign policy aims in Somalia, as 
discussed in section IX. 
Turkey’s support of Hassan Sheikh reportedly emanated less from 
an affinity for the president and more from a wish for continuity and 
continued access to the levers of Somali power and profit. Ankara real-
ized that a change in leadership could also mean a change to their con-
tracts. This is not without precedent, as Hassan Sheikh’s shady award 
of the airport contract to the Turkish firm Favori, LLC – at the expense 
of Dubai-based and South African-staffed SKA International Group – 
could be performed by his successor with a resultant loss to Turkey.31 
VII. Ethiopia 
Ethiopia has played a critically powerful role in Somalia for over a 
decade.32 It reportedly maintains a network of agents – including cur-
rent and former SFG officials33 – and, according to former Ethiopian 
Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, Ethiopian troops control up 
to 60 percent of Somalia’s territory.34 While this may be an exaggera-
tion, Ethiopia does maintain military control throughout much of the 
country’s western and southern regions under the aegis of the regional 
peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union (AU) with the 
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approval of the United Nations, the African Union Mission in Soma-
lia (AMISOM).35 It is also the guarantor of the Jubbaland Compro-
mise Agreement of 2013 that averted a rift between the Jubbaland 
Administration and the SFG, but effectively means that Ethiopia plays 
kingmaker in the state capital of Baidoa.36 Ethiopia also supports the 
de-facto independent but unrecognized Republic of Somaliland, which 
broke away from Mogadishu in 1991 and was instrumental in lobbying 
the UAE’s DP World to sign a tripartite agreement with Ethiopia and 
Somaliland for the Berbera Port. This deal effectively sidelined Moga-
dishu and makes the Balkanization of Somalia almost a fait accom-
pli. “Simply put, a weak and fractured Somalia means that Ethiopia 
can concentrate its attention and forces on quelling persistent internal 
security difficulties and continuing to isolate and pressure [its arch 
nemesis] Eritrea.”37 It can do so because Addis Ababa need no longer 
fear a strong, unified Somalia, such as that under former president 
Mohamed Siad Barre (1969-1991), which successfully fielded an inva-
sion of Ethiopia during the Ogaden War (1977-1978). The advance of 
SNA troops and those of the West Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) – 
composed of ethnic Somalis living in the Ogaden in eastern Ethiopia - 
were only repulsed after the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened on the 
side of the embattled Marxist regime in Addis Ababa.38 The memory 
of this near-defeat has informed Ethiopian foreign policy since then 
and Ethiopia can be said to have taken advantage of the disintegration 
of Somalia that has occurred as a result of the Somali Civil War. Thus, 
while Ethiopia may annoy Mogadishu by its machinations in and sup-
port of the de-facto independent Republic of Somaliland, Mogadishu, 
for example, can only fume at Ethiopia’s 19 percent stake in the Berbera 
Port deal.39 However, it is important to remember that prior to official 
anger (rather than anger on the street) in Mogadishu, the government 
of Hassan Sheikh rubber-stamped the Berbera Port deal after report-
edly receiving payments from Dubai and pressure from Ethiopia.40 
Given Hassan Sheikh's pliant stance vis-à-vis this deal, his acceptance 
of the Jubbaland Compromise Agreement and his penchant for being 
swayed to support the position of the highest bidder, Ethiopia heavily 
favored his reelection and maintenance of the status quo in Villa Soma-
lia.41 When Hassan Sheikh lost the election to Farmajo, a populist who 
unashamedly bashed Ethiopia in his campaign speeches, Ethiopian 
powerbrokers were reportedly angered and stunned.42 
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VIII. The United Kingdom
The UK, for reasons of expediency and political capital, wished, like 
Turkey and Ethiopia, to see Hassan Sheikh remain in power. During 
his tenure, powerful members of the UK government establishment, 
to include former Conservative Party leader Lord Michael Howard of 
Lympne CH, QC were instrumental in a deal signed in August 2013 
between the London-based oil company, Soma Oil & Gas, and the SFG 
to conduct seismic surveys. The deal reportedly involved the payment 
of hundreds of thousands of dollars to key figures in the SFG by Soma 
Oil & Gas in return for oil and gas exploration rights.43 Allegations of 
serious fraud were raised by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia 
and Eritrea and the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) launched an inves-
tigation into the deal in mid-2015. The SFO dropped the investigation 
in late 2016, even though “there were reasonable grounds to suspect 
the commission of offences involving corruption.”44 
UK citizens were also involved in the so-called Fishguard scandal 
wherein Mauritius-registered Somalia-Fishguard Ltd., run by former 
British army soldiers David Walker and Simon Falkner, was given the 
rights to manage all aspects of Somalia’s fishing industry. This included 
the issuance of fishing permits worth millions of dollars for the rights 
to fish off Somalia’s lengthy coastline.45 According to one study, the 
illegal foreign fishing taking place in Somalia’s territorial waters in 
2015, for example, was worth an estimated $306 million a year.46 
Numerous Britons have reportedly utilized their positions, or been 
“deployed” from London, to influence and curry favor with Mogadi-
shu. They furthered business contracts and organized conferences in 
London in order to maintain British influence in the face of stiff com-
petition from Turkey and Turkish businesses as well as to split Somalia 
from certain Arab states, particularly those in the Gulf and Egypt, in 
order to expand British economic and political influence by removing 
competitors.47 These have included Hassan Sheikh’s PR advisor circa 
2013, Richard Bailey, whose salary was reportedly paid by the UK’s 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); Deborah (Bella) Bird, the 
World Bank country director for Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan; and 
Justin Marozzi, the former PR advisor to Prime Minister Abdi Farah 
Shirdon. Louise Cottar, variously described as a Horn of Africa expert 
and low-level advisor to the UN, was personally requested by Has-
san Sheikh48 to act as a buffer between his administration and the UN 
Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea coordinated by Jarat Cho-
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pra, whose questions and subsequent report incensed Villa Somalia 
and many powerful Britons alike.49 
Perhaps the most visible and powerful role has been played by 
Nicholas Kay, variously the head of the UN’s integrated mission to 
Somalia (UNSOM) and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (UN SRSG).50 The role these individuals played in concert 
with London was described by one former Somalia government offi-
cial as “… the most corrupt Europeans… I’ve ever come in contact 
with.”51  
Given the UK’s influence through individuals such as these, as well 
as its donor contributions and powerful NGO and governmental over-
seas aid actors such as the Department for International Development 
(DFID), it has supported initiatives in venues such as the UN that fur-
thered its own agenda as well as those of Hassan Sheikh. For example, 
the UK offered its support for a UN Security Council agreement to ease 
a decades-old arms embargo in March 2013, despite serious concerns.52 
IX. Qatar
Qatar has played a powerful role in Somalia’s politics for over a decade 
despite its small size and population. However, Qatar’s foreign policy 
impetus and objectives in Somalia are something of a black box. David 
B. Roberts has argued that Qatar has consistently attempted to dis-
tance itself from the long shadow cast by Saudi Arabia.53 It has used 
its 1992 defense cooperation agreement with the United States, which 
allows the U.S. military use of Al Udeid Air Base as a tool to discour-
age any overt meddling by Saudi Arabia. At the same time, its rulers 
have used the soft power tools at the disposal of their compact, uber-
hierarchical, oil-rich state to ensure its indispensability to multiple, 
powerful states.54 Qatar’s role has annoyed its close neighbors from 
time to time55 and alarmed regional actors who have borne the brunt 
of Qatar’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts.56 However, its actions 
in support of overt political Islamist actors across the Middle East, 
particularly post-2011, have made Qatar’s position arguably untenable 
as it reportedly lost control of the very Islamist actors it supported and 
led directly to the ongoing Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis, as 
noted below.57  
Regardless of the outcome, Qatar’s use of Islamists to further its 
influence and distance its foreign policy from that of its neighbors is 
one of the defining factors of its foreign policy. In the case of Somalia, 
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Qatar’s role only began in 2006. Mohamed Hussein Gaas presciently 
noted that prior to that time, Qatar possessed no local connections or 
legitimacy.58 However, with the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts 
(UIC), their short-lived rule and the subsequent atomization of Islamist 
movements in Somalia, Qatar began to seriously engage with various 
Islamist factions and former UIC members, attempting to influence 
politics through personal and religious networks and, crucially, mem-
bers of the Somali diaspora. “Often Qatar’s support [to its allies] was 
via Islamist linkages. This reflected a certain practicality given existing 
connections the Qatari elite had across the region. Equally, [Qatar’s 
ruler] and his advisors were also content to support and empower a 
broad range of Islamists, not least because they believed the time for 
moderate Islam to play a role in regional politics had arrived. Conse-
quently, they reasoned, supporting such a movement early on would 
be a savvy political gamble for Qatar.”59 Indeed, influential diaspora 
members reportedly negotiated the arrival of some of the UIC leader-
ship, to include Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, to Qatar after Ethiopia invaded 
Somalia and ended the UIC’s rule. Sheikh Sharif was feted in Doha 
after his arrival in 2007, to include an interview with Al Jazeera.60 
Sheikh Sharif was subsequently elected in 2009, possibly with the 
assistance of significant Qatari funding, but fell out with Doha when 
it insisted on expanding the government to include violent Islamists 
such as Hassan Dahir Aweys and his Hisbul Islam. By 2012, Qatar had 
dropped Sheikh Sharif in favor of a little-known academic, Hassan 
Sheikh, who was promptly elected, reportedly with Fahad Yasin’s 
assistance in the form of Qatari monetary support.61 
During his tenure, Hassan Sheikh alienated himself from Fahad 
Yasin and Qatar by refusing to appoint Farmajo, someone who both 
Doha and their ally in Mogadishu, Fahad Yasin, assessed could influ-
ence Hassan Sheikh to make decisions in their favor. Doha withdrew 
its support for Hassan Sheikh and instead supported Farmajo in the 
2017 presidential election with money again couriered from Doha by 
Fahad Yasin.62 Qatari money and Fahad Yasin’s organizational sup-
port proved absolutely critical to the outcome resulting in Farmajo’s 
election. For example, Fahad Yasin reportedly recruited key defec-
tors and insiders from Hassan Sheikh’s administration such as Hassan 
Ali Kheyre, Thabit Mohamed, Jamal Mohamed Hassan, and Mustaf 
Dhuxulow.63 From his base at the Jazeera Hotel in Mogadishu, Fahad 
Yasin was reportedly provided with secret and sensitive information 
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by these individuals that informed the timing and direction of bribery 
payments to Somali politicians casting their votes.64 
Interestingly, Qatar’s role in Somalia, given its role as kingmaker for 
the past two presidents, remains largely invisible beyond money and 
key Somali allies. This separates it from Turkey’s visible and overt role 
of port and airport operator, military training facilitator, and its pleth-
ora of humanitarian and business actors operating in and around the 
capital. Indeed, Turkey’s and Qatar’s roles in Somalia, while perhaps 
complimentary by nature, have not until recently been so by design 
despite divergent arguments and misleading hyperbole.65 Indeed, per-
ceptions to the contrary that see Turkey’s and Qatar’s role in Somalia as 
lock-step are informed by analysis and commentary on the GCC crisis 
which erupted in June 2017. Pitting Qatar against the KSA, UAE, Bah-
rain and Egypt, developments in Somalia are viewed through the lens 
of this crisis. Given that Qatar’s and Turkey’s involvement in Soma-
lia began at different times and for very different reasons, they thus 
should not be viewed as having always been (and perhaps not even 
now) mutually constitutive or supportive.  
X. Italy
Italy’s desire to affect change in Somalia can be said to be motivated 
by a combination of colonial nostalgia,66 a desire to influence events 
beyond Italy, control of offshore oil and gas blocks and, to a lesser 
degree, making Somalia a stronger destination market for Italian 
goods.67 To this end, Italy attempted to influence the 2017 election in 
Somalia in its favor by leveraging its European Union (EU) role. Italy 
was able to exert large amounts of control over EU policy vis-à-vis 
Somalia because of its "colonial expertise" embodied in the role played 
by Michele Cervone d'Urso, EU Special Envoy and first EU Ambas-
sador for Somalia.68 Thus, by effectively guiding EU policy vis-à-vis 
Somalia and directing the EU's significant financial aid in country, Italy 
has punched above its weight both in Somalia and at international con-
ferences and meetings on Somalia. It also reportedly has consistently 
fed the EU information that was necessarily colored by Italian bias, 
arguably influencing EU policy and priorities.69 
Given its importance, leverage and gravitas, Italy attempted to 
convince regional powers such as the UAE and Ethiopia that Hassan 
Sheikh’s choice for Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke was 
a viable candidate.70 While there is little evidence that Italy’s choice of 
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candidate ever held any sway in Addis Ababa it did play a role in Abu 
Dhabi’s political calculations, as discussed in the next section. Italian 
politicians reportedly liked Omar Abdirashid for two reasons. First, he 
was not Hassan Sheikh and thus offered Italy a chance to reassert itself 
within the ruling elite structure of Mogadishu, a role that had increas-
ingly been swallowed up by Turkey over the course of Hassan Sheikh’s 
tenure. Second, Omar Abdirashid likely supported Italian exploratory 
oil blocks – granted by Kenya to Italian multinational oil and gas com-
pany ENI S.p.A. – off the coast of Somalia and Kenya.71 Evidence of 
Italy’s favoritism for Omar was evidenced by a series of high-level 
meetings in Rome and an official state visit with Italian Prime Minister 
Matteo Renzi in May 2016. This dovetailed rather neatly with Renzi’s 
public declaration to re-engage with Africa and ENI’s commitment to 
invest $20 billion in Africa in the four years from 2016.72 
Italy became increasingly concerned over the moves made by Has-
san Sheikh’s administration to change the maritime border of Kenya 
and Somalia. The government of Hassan Sheikh insisted that Somalia’s 
maritime border with Kenya should be drawn in a southeasterly direc-
tion following the same line as the Kenya-Somalia border as it meets 
the Indian Ocean (rather than stretching due east as Kenya insists). 
When Somalia took Kenya to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in 2015,73 Italian politicians and oil interests were alarmed given ENI’s 
outstanding blocks in the Indian Ocean were now in jeopardy should 
the ICJ rule in favor of Somalia. As Fasil Amdetsion noted, “Perhaps 
no Italian company better epitomizes opacity in its operations, and 
intertwinement of state and corporate interests, than ENI… The Italian 
government is a major shareholder in ENI, and ENI too has long had a 
revolving door between its business and government.”74 Indeed, Renzi 
baldly noted on national television “ENI is a fundamental component 
of our energy policy, our foreign policy, our intelligence policy. By 
intelligence, I mean our secret services.”75 
Given the amount of state and industry collusion and deep fis-
cal and strategic interests offshore in the Horn of Africa region, Italy 
threw its support to Omar Abdirashid. It did so because of the role he 
had previously played as Prime Minister under the former TFG Presi-
dent Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. During his tenure, Omar ordered 
the then Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Abdirah-
man Abdishakur Warsame to sign a controversial memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) with Kenya. This MoU reportedly renounced 
Somalia’s claims to the now contested maritime border by affirming 
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the status quo. Indeed, Kenya has pointed strategically to this MoU as 
proof of its sovereignty over the disputed areas when it awarded con-
tracts to ENI and other oil majors accordingly.76 Thus, Italy’s desire to 
maintain the maritime status quo led directly to their support of Omar. 
XI. The United Arab Emirates (UAE)
The UAE reportedly tried to influence Somalia’s presidential election 
but ultimately failed in its bid to locate a suitable candidate. The UAE’s 
support for Somalia, particularly in the humanitarian and develop-
ment arenas, as well as its efforts in fighting terrorism, has played an 
important, if relatively minor role for over one decade.77 However, its 
role is not without controversy. The UAE was reportedly responsible 
for paying the salaries of at least some units of the Somali National 
Army (SNA) from late 2015 until early 2018.78 Yet allegations of non-
payment to SNA officers and staff date to late 2015. As one anti-cor-
ruption report noted in early 2017, “Salary payments for most units 
of the Somali National Army (SNA) were discontinued in late 2015; 
although, until mid-2016, some units continued receiving stipends that 
was [sic] not paid for by the Somali government…”79 According to the 
report, “The reason for non-payment of salaries is not because of a lack 
of money – tax collections are at $180M p/a according to the former 
state minister of finance – but because of the elections. State resources, 
including taxes and public property that was sold off, were plundered 
in order to finance members of the ruling party running for parlia-
ment, and the president’s own election.”80 This leads to the assumption 
that either a) the UAE delivered the money to the SFG for payment of 
the SNA’s salaries but that it was stolen by the SFG, or b) that the UAE 
did not deliver the money, or c) that the UAE reached a deal with the 
SFG whereby the funds earmarked for the SNA were utilized for other 
purposes. Of the three scenarios, the first seems the most plausible 




Figure 2: “The political fate of Somalia.” Somali opposition figures, to 
include Omar Abdirashid (on his knees, third from left), flock to the UAE 
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Sheikh in his arms and attempts to bring Ethiopia (far right) along. Source: 
Adapted from Amin Arts by Amin Amir: http://www.aminarts.com/
Regarding the 2017 presidential elections, the UAE initially supported 
the incumbent but reportedly offered parallel support to former TFG 
president Sheikh Sharif81 before switching, circa October 2016 and 
based on Italian advice, to another individual they deemed a more 
viable candidate, then-current Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali 
Sharmarke. Abu Dhabi’s interest in electing Omar Abdirashid was 
reportedly threefold. One, by removing Hassan Sheikh from power, 
Qatar’s influence and that of the Muslim Brotherhood – in the form of 
the Turkish AK Party and Hassan Sheikh’s Damul Jadiid – would be 
minimized.82 Two, a new president, pliant to the wishes of and reli-
ant on the UAE, would potentially abrogate existing agreements with 
Turkey thereby paving the way for UAE-based firms such as DP World 
and SKA to claim (or reclaim) the port and airport, respectively.83 
Three, there are indications that pressure from the UAE’s ambassador 
to Somalia, Mohammed Ahmed Othman Al Hammadi, led to Omar’s 
designation as a viable and suitably pliant candidate.84 Operating from 
Nairobi, the ambassador may have developed a positive impression of 
Omar Abdirashid because of his position and resulting patronage net-
work as Prime Minister, his previous position as Prime Minister under 
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TFG President Sheikh Sharif and, importantly, by Italian support for 
Omar Abdirashid’s candidacy.85
The UAE became so interested in Omar that they invited him 
and approximately 20 other Somali politicians to Abu Dhabi in late 
October 2016 in an effort to galvanize support for Omar’s presiden-
tial bid through the distribution of money.86 Yet rather than return-
ing to Somalia and attempting to construct a viable electoral strategy 
around Omar, the politicians (and Omar) reportedly pocketed the 
money for their own personal use and political endeavors.87 After 
this failure, Abu Dhabi reportedly reverted to their dual-track sup-
port of both Hassan Sheikh and Sheikh Sharif. While this strategy 
may appear schizophrenic, it was indicative of the UAE’s attempts 
to hedge and balance in the face of an uncertain electoral outcome in 
order to maintain and possibly grow the UAE’s limited influence, and 
to wring electoral promises from both candidates in favor of the UAE. 
For example, during the election Hassan Sheikh referred to the UAE 
as a “permanent strategic ally” and pledged he would “ensure that 
relationship between the two countries flourish to the maximum if he’s 
re-elected.”88 
By investing in Hassan Sheikh, in particular, the UAE hoped to prise 
the winning candidate away from Turkey and Qatar and make him 
their man in Mogadishu. With the benefit of hindsight however, the 
UAE’s choice of candidates appears to have been flawed and unduly 
influenced by Italian prognostications. Omar Abdirashid, Hassan 
Sheikh and Sheikh Sharif were all known quantities in Somalia hav-
ing all spent time in office marred by allegations of corruption and 
score-settling. They were therefore unpopular on the street as well as 
with donors. While this would not normally make much difference 
in a closed and patently unfair election, the 2017 election was con-
ducted against the backdrop of significant anger against the perceived 
excesses of Hassan Sheikh and his regime, and populist language by 
candidates such as Farmajo aimed at foreign influence and meddling, 
particularly Ethiopian, proved a powerful mobilizer. 
XII. The United States
The elephant in the Somalia election room was the United States. The 
feeling among many Somali politicians and diaspora stakeholders just 
prior to the 2017 election was that should the US get involved behind 
one candidate or a group of candidates, Hassan Sheikh’s days in office 
ȲȲǯȱŗŞ
38
would quickly be over. The US had many reasons to dislike Hassan 
Sheikh, to include US anger at unsavory deals done with UK poli-
ticians and businesses such as Soma,89 rampant corruption at Villa 
Somalia, and alleged collusion with al-Shabaab. Yet US Somalia policy 
was and remains hamstrung by multiple variables, with two factors 
reigning supreme. First, the US does not really have a Somalia pol-
icy beyond security and the provision of security-related aid. This is 
largely motivated by what could be termed the Horn of Africa coun-
terterrorism soup du jour: al-Shabaab. Second, the 2016 US election 
introduced a high degree of uncertainty into an already moribund and 
second-tier US foreign policy imperative. With the election of Donald 
Trump and confusion over administration priorities, US policies and 
strategies in a corner of Africa that many in Washington would prefer 
to forget were further de-emphasized. US ambassadors to Somalia, 
from their base in Nairobi, have failed to achieve much leverage in 
Mogadishu.90 US government day-to-day operations in Somalia have 
similarly been handicapped by personnel leaving their posts citing 
frustration and personal reasons.91 They also seem to have curried little 
traction with certain members of the SFG who pejoratively referred 
to former US Political Counselor for Somalia Affairs Bob Patterson 
as “simplistic” and former US Political Counselor for Somalia Affairs 
Cheryl Sim as the “loud American.”92 Given electoral uncertainty and 
a lack of continuity in both policy and personnel, America’s interest in 
the outcome of the 2017 election was low. 
XIII. Conclusion
Much has been made of the outsider status of Farmajo, a reputation 
that he and his allies, notably Fahad Yasin, broadcast effectively to the 
electorate on the street. Yet it is important to highlight that Farmajo is a 
known quantity inside Somalia and with the Somali diaspora. Farmajo 
returned to Somalia and served briefly as Prime Minister in 2010 under 
President Sheikh Sharif.93 According to some reports Farmajo appears 
to have carried out his brief tenure well, reportedly paying overdue sti-
pends to government soldiers and requiring cabinet members disclose 
their assets.94 Yet this is contradicted by Abdirazak Fartaag’s detailed 
report demonstrating Farmajo’s shady financial dealings with Sheikh 
Sharif and other government officials while in office, thus tarnishing 
his “clean hands” image.95 Despite his corrupt practices while in office, 
Farmajo did resign in mid-2011 in protest over what he saw as politi-
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cal machinations by Sheikh Sharif to remain in power. His resignation 
was met with street protests in Mogadishu and in cities with diaspora 
populations such as Toronto.96 Bucking the trend for most Somali poli-
ticians, Farmajo left office relatively popular, thus helping his chances 
in 2017.97 
Farmajo was considered a viable candidate simply because the other 
main candidates with real chances of election, Sheikh Sharif and Omar 
Abdirashid, were considered almost as toxic as Hassan Sheikh. Their 
viability depended almost entirely on clan political calculations and 
their ability to bribe voters. In the case of Hassan Sheikh, his access to 
money via the SFG as well as counting on the support of Turkey, Ethio-
pia and the UK made him the candidate to beat. But Hassan Sheikh 
had his weaknesses. He was notoriously and publicly corrupt, thus 
earning the ire of the Somali street. Additionally, he had incurred the 
wrath of certain powerful members of his own sub-clan. 
The fact that Farmajo was not Hassan Sheikh is one of the compel-
ling reasons he may have won the final vote for president. But it is 
not the only reason. The Somali street, as discussed, played a role in 
the election, but only insofar as channeling votes away from Hassan 
Sheikh and other candidates with track records in power and in voic-
ing their opposition to Ethiopian meddling in Somalia affairs. Farma-
jo’s populism and his verbal barbs aimed at both corrupt SFG ministers 
and Ethiopian powerbrokers in Somalia met with approval inside and 
outside Somalia, drawing as they did on grievances that cross clan and 
gender lines.  Yet the men and women of Mogadishu, Barawe, Garowe 
and Kismayo did not vote, of course. That was left up to the men 
of power and privilege at the voting hall inside Mogadishu’s Airport 
compound.  And while evidence seems to demonstrate that they did 
heed popular calls for an end to overt Ethiopian meddling in Somali 
affairs by voting for Farmajo, the anti-Ethiopian candidate, their votes 
were cast based on the amount of money candidates could deliver and 
this depended, to a large degree, on how involved and supportive out-
side powers chose to be in relation to the election.
Hassan Sheikh’s election war chest dwarfed the other candidates –
even Farmajo’s with his access to Qatari money via Fahad Yasin. How-
ever, Hassan Sheikh reportedly had miscalculated by not paying the 
salaries of various civil servants over the preceding years, thus cost-
ing him the support of key members of parliament and other voting 
members. Farmajo was able to count on Qatar’s financial and political 
support as well as Fahad Yasin’s organizational acumen at a critical 
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juncture.98 Turkey remained overtly neutral throughout the process 
and there is no indication that Ankara provided money directly to 
Hassan Sheikh specifically for his reelection. Ethiopia remained con-
vinced that Hassan Sheikh would prevail given his incumbency and 
material power, but gravely miscalculated. The UK, in the person of 
Michael Keating managed over $6 million in funds to assist in regis-
tration and other expenses, but London appears to have either been 
caught off guard by Farmajo’s chances or, more likely, their fears were 
assuaged by the promise that Hassan Ali Khaire—a dual Somali and 
Norwegian citizen, former regional director for the Norwegian Refu-
gee Council, and executive director for Africa for Soma Oil and Gas—
would be chosen as Farmajo’s Prime Minister.99 The US possessed the 
clout and resources to have significantly affected the 2017 elections in 
Mogadishu but, as noted, remained mired in its own presidential race 
and the uncertainty that accompanied the election of Donald Trump. 
Italy failed in its choice to significantly influence the direction and 
choices of Villa Somalia when it threw its support to Omar Abdirashid, 
yet it is doubtful that Rome would have offered the amounts of money 
to Omar that wealthier actors such as Qatar were offering to their can-
didates.100 Italy's choice of candidate also affected the UAE's political 
calculations vis-à-vis Somalia. This has had some serious implications 
for Abu Dhabi's foreign policy in the Horn of Africa where the GCC 
crisis appears to be playing out in worrisome detail. The Berbera Port 
deal between Ethiopia, the de-facto independent Republic of Somalil-
and and DP World reportedly incensed powerful interests in Mogadi-
shu who view Somalia as a unitary state and one that should be ruled 
from Mogadishu. That Qatar's choice of candidate, Farmajo as well as 
their man in Mogadishu, Fahad Yasin now occupy Villa Somalia has 
only complicated matters and some see the hand of Qatar and pos-
sibly Turkey in the April 2018 SFG's seizure of UAE diplomatic cargo 
worth over $9 million and the resulting rupture in diplomatic relations 
between the UAE and Somalia. If this is indeed the case, nothing bet-
ter demonstrates the importance and the grave consequences of rising 
powers jockeying for position in the Horn of Africa.  
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